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401 
IN HONOR OF A SIMPLE-MINDED 
ORIGINALIST 
MORAL PUZZLES AND LEGAL PERPLEXITIES: 
ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF LARRY 
ALEXANDER. Edited by Heidi M. Hurd.1 Cambridge 
University Press. 2019. Pp. xxvi + 463.  $110.00 (Cloth). 
James Allan2 
In May, 2017 the Yale Law School’s Center for Law and 
Philosophy, together with the University of Illinois’ Program in 
Law and Philosophy, co-hosted a conference at the alma mater of 
Larry Alexander, Yale Law School. The conference brought 
together eminent legal scholars in the areas of criminal law 
theory, constitutional law theory, jurisprudence and moral 
philosophy. They were there to honor Professor Larry Alexander 
of the University of San Diego School of Law, and the result of 
that celebratory conference, or Festschrift (in these more globalist 
times), is this very recently published Cambridge University Press 
book. And my, oh my, it is a very good book indeed. I mean that 
not just in the sense of it being good compared to the usual book-
length edited collection of two dozen odd essays that have to be 
stuffed between two covers. I mean it is a really good book even 
by the standards of a well-crafted, sole-authored monograph. The 
editor, Heidi Hurd, has done an excellent job of fitting together 
into a coherent whole all 22 contributing authors’ essays or 
chapters, together with her own introduction and a last-word-
reply-to-everyone final say by Alexander himself. 
The book has four Parts, namely (and in order) “Puzzles in 
Criminal Law,” “Problems in Constitutional Law,” “Perplexities 
in Jurisprudence,” and “Parodoxes in Moral Philosophy.”  Given 
the usual interests of the readers of this journal, I will focus on just 
 
 1.  Ross and Helen Workman Chair in Law and Professor of Philosophy, University 
of Illinois. 
 2.  Garrick Professor in Law, T.C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland. 
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the middle two of those Parts, which in various ways elucidate 
important issues that bear on constitutional law—though, let me 
here say that any readers with more catholic tastes will find 
fascinating the Part I chapters on such things as desert-based 
punishment, whether failed criminal attempts are less culpable 
than those that succeed, and the best understanding of duress 
(with Alexander’s end-of-book replies) together with the Part IV 
chapters that raise such topics as threshold deontology and the 
difficulty in theorizing wrongful discrimination (with Alexander 
at the end doubting that any account of discrimination’s 
wrongfulness can succeed and defending deontology with 
thresholds). I suppose the prefatory point is that Alexander is a 
man of wide-ranging interests in law who brings a powerful 
analytical mind to bear on all sorts of theoretical legal issues. You 
learn from him even when you ultimately disagree with him (as 
this reviewer does as regards, say, the comparative attractions of 
consequentialism and deontology). Surely that’s one of the 
highest compliments one can receive. 
In what follows, however, I will cleave to the book’s Parts II 
and III, the constitutional law-related contributions. And most 
obviously that brings me to the question of constitutional 
interpretation because Larry Alexander is a leading proponent of 
originalism, of the old school (and these days very minority) 
intentionalist variety. As a self-described “simple-minded 
originalist,”3 Alexander embraces his position firstly as a thesis 
about how language is used, secondly as one about the nature of 
all interpretation, and thirdly in normative terms about why in 
interpreting we should defer to the intended meanings of the 
authors of legal texts—so it is all three for Alexander, semantic, 
pragmatic and normative. In fact, in his end-of-book reply 
Alexander lays out an abbreviated step-by-step account of his 
position, one which I am here further condensing: 
1. A text . . . is a set of symbols . . . that is meant by its 
 
 3. Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM 87 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); see also Larry 
Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139 (2010) (describing Originalist 
interpretation akin to telepathic communication); Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why 
and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (2013) (arguing ignoring authorial intent 
undermines the endeavour the drafter undertook); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna 
Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speaking?” Some Arguments for the Primacy of Intent in 
Interpretation, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004) (distinguishing intentionalist from 
textualist interpretations of law). 
5 - ALLAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19  6:29 PM 
2019] BOOK REVIEWS 403 
 
producer—the author(s)—to communicate a message to 
the intended audience . . . . 
2. If there is no author—no person who produced the marks, 
sounds, etc. in order to convey a message—we do not have 
a text. The marks . . . may be a sign of something, much as 
smoke is a sign of fire . . . . Marks that might look like 
symbols, when we understand they are not—think of cloud 
formations that resemble the letters C-A-T—render 
certain questions nonsensical that would make sense were 
there an author . . . . 
3. Texts are individuated by the messages their authors are 
intending to convey thereby. That is why the text of the US 
Constitution in Spanish can be the same as its text in 
English . . . . 
4. When our interest is in the actual authors of a text and the 
message they intended to convey thereby, we are acting as 
“originalists.” . . . 
5. The “conventional meanings” of words—what meaning 
dictionaries would assign them—are merely the meanings 
most people at a particular time and in a particular locale 
would intend to convey by those words. These meanings 
are therefore time and place bound, and can and do change 
over time and from place to place. But authors may, and 
often do, employ unconventional meanings. . . . If their 
intended audience understands [what the authors are 
unconventionally doing], then the authors can be successful 
in conveying their message to their intended audience . . . . 
6. Authors rely on implicatures and implicitures in conveying 
their intended messages. They often mean more, and 
sometimes less, than they actually say. . . . 
 . . . 
7. [Turning now explicitly to interpreting legal texts:] In 
whomever the authority to enact legal norms resides . . . 
then, when they decide which norms to enact and attempt 
to communicate those norms through a written or oral text, 
the job of the intended audience is to figure out what norms 
the authors enacted and intended to communicate. If the 
audience chooses legal norms that differ from those the 
authors chose to enact and communicate, the authority of 
the authors is undermined. Only originalism is authority-
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preserving. 
8. Any departure from originalism either transfers authority 
from the authors to someone else—for example, to 
judges—or to some mindless process, such as the process 
by which the meanings of words change over time . . . . 
9. . . . [N]onoriginalist interpretation really represents a 
transfer of authority . . . from one body or person to 
another or to some mindless (nonplanning) process. . . . 
10. Interpretation of texts is an empirical, not a normative, 
endeavor. The interpreter wants to know what norm the 
authorities intended to communicate through their text. It 
is often quite difficult to answer the interpreter’s question. 
The authorities may have expressed their intended norm 
poorly. Or the text may be old or ambiguous, and the 
context of its promulgation unclear or unknown. But, 
however difficult interpretation may be, it is unavoidable if 
the norms we are to be governed by are the norms those 
with authority to govern us intended. 
11. Finally, interpretation must deal with the fact that some 
legal authorities are multimember bodies, and sometimes 
bicameral multimember bodies, and can enact legal norms 
only with the concurrence of majorities or supermajorities. 
What is the intended meaning of a legal text when the 
members who voted to enact it did not intend to convey the 
same meanings and, hence, the same norms by it? This is 
the aggregation problem. In my view, it cannot be avoided. 
And when there is no shared meaning that the requisite 
number of norm enactors endorse, then the text they enact 
is legal gibberish. . . . Perhaps that unfortunate result is rare. 
Perhaps it can be avoided by having those who vote for the 
text accept the meaning intended by some person or 
committee without having that meaning in mind 
themselves. I see no way, however, to make the 
aggregation problem disappear without at the same time 
undermining the authority of those who are supposed to 
possess it. (pp. 415-418). 
That, at its core, is the strand of originalism often dubbed 
Original Intended Meaning or “OIM” originalism. Larry 
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Alexander, along with Richard Kay4 and (in his later works) 
Stanley Fish,5 are probably its best-known and most insightful 
proponents. At any rate, this OIM or “old originalist” camp is a 
small one, certainly much smaller than the other main strand of 
originalism, which most often travels under the moniker Original 
Public Meaning or “OPM” or even new originalism.  And that 
takes us back to Part II of the book, because four of the seven 
chapters in this Part are by contributors who, in one way or 
another, attack OIM (or in Alexander’s own self-descriptive 
terms “simple-minded”) originalism. Connie Rosati (chapter 
nine), Fred Schauer (chapter twelve), Larry Solum (chapter 
eleven) and Jeff Goldsworthy (chapter ten) all take issue with 
Alexander’s OIM strand of originalism. Rosati, the most 
sweeping of the four in terms of her skepticism of the Alexander 
position, has the least seeming sympathy for any sort of originalist 
approach to interpretation. Though she nowhere in the chapter 
lays her own cards on the table, the reader will bet she is some 
sort of “Living Constitution” or possibly Dworkinian adherent. 
Be that as it may, she proceeds to catalogue a bevy of potential 
deficiencies as regards the OIM position. And yet, in his 
concluding response at book’s end, I think Alexander 
convincingly answers all of Rosati’s points—that his position is a 
semantic, pragmatic and normative one, all three; that OPM 
originalists also seek the author’s intended meaning, they just do 
so by restricting themselves to the publicly available evidence at 
the time of promulgation; that, yes, it is coherent to talk of 
“sentence meaning,” but that is nothing more than a shorthand 
for “what most speakers (authors) at a particular time and place 
would mean had they uttered (written) the text in question”6 (p. 
419); and that the group intentions or aggregation problem is 
indeed a real one, but that it “is one not avoided by public 
meaning originalists.” (p. 419). 
Schauer’s chapter is bifurcated, though both halves focus on 
 
 4. See, e.g., Richard Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009) (arguing for interpreters’ suspension of their 
own views in interpreting the Constitution); Richard Kay, Construction, Originalist 
Interpretation and the Complete Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1 (2017) 
(noting that intentionalism will lead to clearer outcomes in constitutional arguments). 
 5. See Stanley Fish, The Intentionalist Thesis Once More, in CHALLENGE, supra note 
3, at 99 (arguing the intentionalism elicits the true meaning of constitutional text). 
 6. Indeed, Alexander goes on to note that “we can always ask what a text would 
mean had it been authored by someone other than its actual author.” (p. 419). 
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the lawmaker’s intentions. The first half looks at Alexander’s 
freedom of speech writings,7 Schauer here agreeing with 
Alexander that “the focus in evaluating the constitutionality of 
some speech-related state action or rule must be on governmental 
intent”—Is it seeking to limit speech based on its content only? 
and not on the effect of a governmental action” (p. 209).  So in a 
world where virtually all governmental actions will have direct or 
indirect effects on who can say what, and when neither speaker’s 
intent nor the consequences of the government action ought to be 
central considerations of constitutionality; the focus “must be on 
why government is taking the action under challenge” (p. 209). 
Schauer is very interesting here in setting out, and agreeing with, 
Alexander’s position.  He even moots the notion that “we might 
understand constitutional rights and constitutional adjudication 
generally as being more about disabling government than about 
empowering citizens …[from which it is but a short step] to the 
conclusion that governmental motives ought to be the touchstone 
of the inquiry [not just as regards freedom of speech, but for 
freedom of religion, equal protection, and more.]” (pp. 212-213). 
However, in the second half of Schauer’s chapter, when he 
turns to the persuasiveness or otherwise of OIM, the agreement 
with Alexander goes out the window. Well, in fact, the two 
thinkers do agree that the core function of law—in a world of well-
meaning people who unavoidably have reasonable moral and 
political disagreements amongst themselves—is to deliver a 
settlement of those disagreements, a sort of second-best solution 
in a world where that is as good as can ever be on offer. (pp. 218-
219). Where they then most noticeably differ, and it flows from 
that agreed premise, is on whether ‘going with the conventional 
meaning and forget about intended meaning, even when the two 
conflict’—what Alexander describes as “mindless law” (p. 425)—
provides a desirable settlement function. Schauer says: “Or, to put 
it more bluntly, conventional meaning textualism might suck, but 
at some times and in some places and on some subjects it might 
 
 7. As does Brian Leiter in chapter seven, who agrees with Alexander that in essence 
the case for protecting speech boils down to a distrust of government. Both recognize that 
the content of speech can cause serious harms. But in any cost-benefit calculation, the 
dangers of handing too much regulatory say to those currently in power is such that you 
are better off [in Alexander’s words] with “a heavy judicial thumb on the scale against the 
validity of certain types of regulations of the content of expression.” (p. 427, Leiter’s 
formulation being on p. 128)  Leiter then takes the discussion into the realm of academic 
freedom, where again he and Alexander agree. (p. 427). 
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suck less than original intent originalism” (p. 219). Alexander 
replies that he “think[s] mindless law should be an anathema. The 
vision it conjures is of lawmakers choosing symbols but then some 
mindless process determining what they shall mean.  . . . [like] 
consulting the entrails of an ox or the oracle of Delphi. For all the 
many imperfections of human lawmakers and of those seeking to 
glean the lawmakers’ intended meanings, I think we should prefer 
them to the mindlessness of non-existent8 conventional 
meanings.” (p. 425). 
I side with Alexander on this issue of whether conventional 
meaning interpretation ought to act as the settlement function; it 
should not. And I side with Alexander, not just for the reasons he 
gives above, which boil down to the persuasive claim that a 
locked-in commitment to doing one’s best to find intended 
meaning will suck a lot less—on average, over time—than just 
applying dictionary definitions (or however it is you think 
conventional meaning can be cashed out), even when you know 
for certain no one intended them. I also suspect the Schauer 
defence of conventional meaning textualism, whether he intends 
it to be or not, can function as a sort of disguised vehicle for 
handing more power to those at the point-of-application of laws, 
the judges. Conventional meanings absent actual human 
intentions, at the very least, will deliver a lot more uncertainty 
which some living being today will have to reduce, remove or 
resolve. Likewise this textualism will force answers we know to be 
wrong. (When Snoop Dog describes something as “bad,” are we 
really going to insist, everywhere and always, that the evaluation 
is an unfavorable one?)  Likewise again, when conventional 
meanings suck more than answers delivered by some other 
approach, do we not suspect, all of us, that the judges will abandon 
conventionalism? And, anyway, what sucks for one of today’s 
judges might not suck for one of today’s voters—so who made the 
judge the effective lawgiver, which he or she by default becomes 
when imposing the mindless law? And why should I as that voter 
feel there is any legitimacy to such judge-made or made-by-no-
one law, to the extent of obeying it? At any rate, read the debate 
between these two deep thinkers, and sometime collaborators, 
and decide for yourself on this one. 
 
 8. They are “non-existent” given Alexander’s point 2 above— i.e., his denial that 
marks on paper have any meaning, conventional or otherwise, “in the absence of the 
assumption of some author who means something by them.” (p. 424). 
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That brings me to Larry Solum and Jeff Goldsworthy, both 
of whom are themselves originalists. So here we move into the 
intra-family debates, where these two contributors’ positions are 
in agreement with the Alexandrian one vastly more often than 
not, and where their competing interpretive approaches will 
overwhelmingly deliver the same outcomes as Alexander’s. We 
are talking about disagreements at the outer margins of the 
known originalist solar system, in other words. Solum may well be 
America’s leading OPM originalist, certainly he is one of them, 
and Goldsworthy is Australia’s best known originalist, bar none. 
Start with Solum, who helpfully situates OIM within the wider 
originalist family (p. 191) after having noted that “[i]ntentions are 
essential for meaning, but this does not entail the conclusion that 
the meaning of a text must be the meaning the author intended to 
communicate.” (p. 190).  When I come to Goldsworthy in a 
moment, I will come back to this question of the meaning of 
“meaning,” but Solum’s idea is that a text can mean more than 
what its author(s) intended—as the “existence of conventional 
semantic meanings is entirely consistent with the notion that 
intentions must play a role in the production of meaning.” (p. 
196). In other words, conventional meanings are a function of 
intended meanings, which is why Solum’s OPM strand and 
Alexander’s OIM strand of originalism, “are likely to produce 
identical [interpretive] results except in cases where there was a 
failure of constitutional communication.” (p. 192). Authors’ 
intentions are crucial to both, it is just that Solum wants to stake 
out the position, in contrast to Alexander, that “conventional 
semantic meanings are not identical with or reducible to 
individual communicative intentions, nor are they supervenient 
on such meanings.” (p. 197), so that the “public meaning of a 
constitutional provision is the meaning that the provision had for 
the public at the time the provision was framed and ratified.” (p. 
199). Hence, under the Solum framework, you potentially have 
public meaning as well as author’s meaning, and while “author’s 
meaning and public meaning may differ, there are good reasons 
to believe that they will converge most (or almost all) of the time.” 
(p. 199). Still, “there are situations where the two meanings can 
diverge.” (p. 199).   When they do, says Solum, “a choice must be 
made” (p.200), with the moniker OPM being a big clue as to how 
he thinks you should choose. There are some even more minor 
quibbles between Solum and Alexander, but that claim, with 
OPM’s preference for public meaning when they diverge, is the 
5 - ALLAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19  6:29 PM 
2019] BOOK REVIEWS 409 
 
core dispute,9 and at the heart of the back and forth debate 
between them. 
That said, I want to take up this debate between OIM and 
OPM originalists, not least because I am one of the rare few who 
has changed his mind in the unusual direction (after reading the 
likes of Alexander and Kay) and moved away from OPM to 
thinking OIM is the more persuasive branch. And I want to do so 
by focussing more on Goldsworthy’s chapter, though truth be told 
readers will struggle to put a piece of paper between the core 
Solum and Goldsworthy positions. I think I just find 
Goldsworthy’s terminology easier to use for the non-aficionado, 
as he talks in terms of subjective intentionalism (“SI”), objective 
intentionalism (“OI”), and public meaning originalism 
(“PMO”)—while noting that “[PMO] . . . is often a version of 
OI[,]” (p. 182) with Goldsworthy earlier stating explicitly that, in 
his view, “Larry Solum’s public meaning originalism [is] a version 
of the [OI] position.” (p. 170). Accordingly, the debate that 
interests Goldsworthy is between OIs like him, and SIs like 
Alexander (and, full disclosure one more time, like me). It is, as I 
said, an intra-familial dispute and Goldsworthy sees it as one 
where “SI maintains that judges should seek the lawmaker’s 
actual subjective intentions, whereas OI holds that those 
intentions are relevant only insofar as they were publicly 
manifested, in that sufficient evidence of them was made readily 
available to the public or at least to legal advisers.” (p.175). 
Remember, both SI and OI put much weight on authors’ 
intentions. Indeed, both camps agree that non-originalist 
interpretive approaches, from “Living Constitutionalism” to 
“moral readings” on to “Dworkinian best-fit approaches,” 
transfer authority from the author to the point-of-application 
interpreter (or to some mindless process). And recall that 
Alexander and his fellow SI types think that intended meaning is 
the uptake an author wants to produce in his or her audience, 
which OI does not seem to dispute. Or put differently, texts are 
the messages authors intend to convey. 
 
 9. Though one key reply Alexander offers to one of these peripheral disputes is that 
“it is quite possible to intend another’s intended meaning[,]” (p. 424) such that there is 
nothing incoherent in holding the view that some or many ratifiers might have intended 
whatever meaning the authors of the Constitution intended—just as “‘I might intend to 
convey whatever she intends to convey by that text’” might be the stance one takes “when 
voting in a faculty meeting on a proposal drafted by a committee that [one is] too lazy or 
uninterested to read, much less understand.” (p. 424).   
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Accordingly, the nub of the theoretical disagreement 
between OIs and SIs centers on situations in which an author or 
authors fail to communicate the meaning he, she, or they intend 
to communicate. There is misunderstanding. There is 
miscommunication. Suppose, for instance, that in uttering a 
statement you intend to communicate to your chosen audience 
message X, but most or all of that audience (based on the publicly 
available evidence) understands Y. Now, one can at this point ask 
the theoretical question of whether the meaning of the statement 
was X or Y. And that depends, as it were, on the meaning of 
“meaning”—is it a) what you as author intended them to take you 
to have meant by your statement, or is it b) what your audience is 
likely to take you to have meant by your statement? Goldsworthy 
says, and I think Solum concurs, that it is b). “[W]hen your 
utterance fails to communicate your meaning to your intended 
audience (through your fault not theirs), but communicates some 
other meaning to them instead, that other meaning—and not your 
meaning—must be the meaning of your utterance.” (p. 178) 
(emphasis added). 
But to my mind there is no “must” about it. Alexander’s reply 
is that Goldsworthy “seems to . . . trade on a confusion between 
what is said and what is meant. Or, to put it in terms that I think 
are more apt, “Goldsworthy’s distinction is between what your 
audience is likely to take you to have meant by your statement 
and what you intended them to take you to have meant by it.” (p. 
420). I would put it this way: this debate about the best or 
preferable understanding of “meaning” is not a dictionary 
dispute; it is not a definitional matter. Just as H.L.A. Hart makes 
clear in chapter 9 of The Concept of Law,10 when urging readers 
to adopt a wider rather than a narrower understanding of “law” 
(i.e., one that includes the morally egregious), this is not an “is” 
matter but an “ought” one. How should we understand law?  And 
Hart gives a list of utilitarian reasons for adopting the wider 
understanding. 
Likewise here. The debate between OIs and SIs is on the 
“ought” level: how should we understand what counts as the 
meaning of a text? Because it seems clear to me that a person 
could, if he or she wished, specify or announce or designate that 
the dictionary understanding of “meaning” henceforth would be 
 
 10. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181–207 (1961). 
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either a) or b) above. Similarly, pointing to what courts presently 
do (as Goldsworthy does to buttress his side of the argument (pp. 
171-172)) is on the “is” plane. At most, it tells us what judges 
today treat as falling within the aegis of “meaning,” but that is not 
an answer on the theoretical plane of how “meaning” should be 
understood. There, on that theoretical plane, the question is 
which understanding is preferable. Here are some of my own 
grounds for siding with Alexander and Kay (and in a way with 
that well-known SI Humpty Dumpty) and saying it is a)—that 
meaning should be understood as being what you, the author, 
intended it to be; it should not be understood as being what the 
audience took it to be, however justified in doing so that audience 
may have been. 
1.  Alexander’s view makes “meaning” an empirical question. 
Goldsworthy’s makes it in part a normative or value-laden (or 
added value-laden) question. Goldsworthy seemingly concedes 
that his “meaning is what the audience understands” view entails 
the fact that there can be different meanings for different 
audience members (p. 185). “If this is a bullet . . . then OI must 
bite it” (p. 185) concedes Goldsworthy, with a proviso that SI can 
lead to the same utterance having different meanings for different 
listeners as well if that is what the author intends—think of coded 
messages to spies in occupied Europe. But that proviso is weak. 
The author’s meaning for the Gestapo should they come upon the 
message is intended by the author to be X and for the French 
Resistance it is intended to be Y, and for the same marks on the 
same paper. For Alexander, the search for meaning is empirical, 
what was intended by real life humans. For OI adherents, author’s 
intentions are not always ultimately determinative, by their 
theory’s stipulation in fact. So sometimes meaning depends, for 
Goldsworthy, on identifying a representative member of the 
intended audience. And at that point I further agree with 
Alexander and Kay that such an identifying task is an unavoidably 
arbitrary process, despite Goldsworthy’s claim that “[t]his seems 
to [him] an exaggeration.” (p. 185). Actually, it is arbitrary in one 
sense, and in another sense we know before we start the “let’s 
identify some representative member of the audience” task that it 
is a process that is overwhelmingly likely to deliver up a 
“representative audience member” who, when uncertainties 
arise, will look a lot like the interpreter who went in search of him 
or her in the first place—a lot like Scalia or Solum or Goldsworthy 
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or whomever it is that happens to be doing the interpreting 
through the prism of the “representative member of the 
audience.” 
2.  Goldsworthy, as just noted, thinks the force of this 
“arbitrary” point is over-stated. We should ask “what a well-
informed, intelligent and, competent lawyer at the time of 
enactment would have understood the law to communicate.” (p. 
185). Presumably Goldsworthy believes that will get rid of most 
of the range of possible “OI meanings.” But I think Goldsworthy 
is wrong. For instance, take any of the handful of statutory bills of 
rights at the State level in my country of Australia. Off the cuff, I 
can immediately think of a law professor (in favor of such 
instruments where I am not) who would disagree with me about 
what those statutes mean. So either one of us is not competent, 
intelligent, or well-informed, or one of us is not basing his or her 
views on the publicly available evidence of legislative intent. Or—
my position—the views and beliefs and value-judgements and 
even sentiments of the interpreter, even one who is a “well-
informed, intelligent, and competent lawyer” (p. 185) matter. 
Sometimes they matter a lot. There is a range or spectrum of 
people who fall under the aegis of being reasonable, smart, 
competent, and well-informed, and picking between them is, well, 
arbitrary. (Nor would that fact surprise a Humean non-cognitivist 
like me.)11 Moreover, we see this all the time, even with judges 
who disagree, even with judges who claim to be originalists. So I 
think both the arbitrary point and the “too many alternative 
possible meanings” point are persuasive factors in deciding how 
we should understand what meaning is. They push you towards 
thinking SI is preferable to OI. 
3.  Here is another difficulty for Goldsworthy and the OI 
position. I refer to the notion of “fault.” Goldsworthy makes clear 
that OI is only supposed to kick in when the miscommunication is 
the fault of the author, not when it is the fault of the listener or 
listeners.12 I take it that if the miscommunication is the fault of the 
 
 11. See, e.g., JAMES ALLAN, A SCEPTICAL THEORY OF MORALITY AND LAW (1998) 
(arguing for moral scepticism and a functional relationship between law and morality); 
James Allan, Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s Stone, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133 
(2008) (responding against Waldron’s assertion for the use of international law for 
American legal reasoning). For what it is worth, my guess is that Goldsworthy is also, 
broadly speaking, a Humean non-cognitivist. 
 12. Goldsworthy makes this explicit: he says “through your fault not theirs” (p. 178). 
“Your” refers to the maker of the utterance, and “theirs” the intended audience. 
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intended audience, then for Goldsworthy the statement means 
what the author intended it to mean. Hence, for OI adherents, 
only if it is the author’s fault does the miscommunication result in 
the statement meaning something other than what the author 
intended. But this fault-based divide is obviously a problematic 
distinction. Imagine a ninety-nine person audience. The author 
intends his message to mean X. Fifty take it to mean X. Forty-nine 
take it to mean Y. All base their choice on publicly available 
evidence. So the OI meaning is X, and by numerical luck that 
happens to line up with the SI meaning. Of course if it were 49-50 
the other way, then the meaning would not be what the author 
intended for Goldsworthy and the OIs. It would be what fifty out 
of ninety-nine understood it to be based on the publicly available 
information. For Alexander and the SIs, the meaning would still 
be X, but the author should have done a better job 
communicating. Put differently, the meaning would be stable for 
Alexander, even if one audience member changes her mind about 
what the author was trying to convey. What can vary for SI 
adherents is whether the author’s intended meaning was in fact 
successfully communicated, not the meaning itself. 
Or go back to our ninety-nine person audience where fifty of 
ninety-nine misunderstand the author and think Y rather than the 
intended X. And now assume in my above scenario that the 
audience’s median (or indeed any single person’s) IQ was 120, 
and then start lowering it one IQ point a minute. Just when, 
precisely, does the meaning of the author’s utterance change? 
Because as you lower the median IQ or a single person’s IQ at 
some point the miscommunication will become the fault of the 
audience, at which point we are to suppose that the meaning 
reverts to the SI one of author’s intended meaning. Meaning, in 
other words, becomes hostage to the intelligence of the audience, 
or at least to the author’s ability to discover that intelligence and 
craft his method of communicating his intended meaning 
accordingly. Or, we could cut through all of this and just say 
“meaning” is stable, and whether an author is able to 
communicate it successfully is variable and dependent upon a host 
of factors. 
At any rate, those are some of the grounds for why on the 
theoretical plane I some time ago moved over to agree with 
Alexander and prefer SI to OI. Or, if you would like to think of it 
this way, the SI/OI difference comes down to there being, in rare 
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situations, a serious problem for each position. In cases where the 
difference matters (which Alexander, Goldsworthy, and Solum all 
agree is seldom)—i.e., when there has been a mistaken 
communication—once the mistake has been convincingly 
discovered, SI calls for the enforcement of the “until recently 
inaccessible” law that we now believe was intended (subject to 
compensating reliance interests, of course, and not doing so if the 
costs would now be catastrophic). OI avoids this problem, but at 
the price of wanting to continue to enforce a law that no lawmaker 
ever adopted or intended or legitimately brought into being. So it 
is a kind of pick-your-poison situation. I am with Alexander and 
Kay and Fish and a few others in the SI camp rather than with 
Goldsworthy, Solum, and the more numerous OI/OPM strand of 
originalism.  That said, I also agree that, in practice, on the plane 
of real-life interpreting, there is virtually nothing in it.   The two 
approaches overwhelmingly deliver the same outcomes, because 
both look to what authors intend to convey. 
Of course one can understand what is bothering many OIs in 
terms of rule of law values. Alexander hints at this himself when 
he gives this caveat: “Let me also put aside the possibility that a 
legal system might have rules limiting legal interpretation to only 
certain types of evidence.” (p. 422). If there were such rules, they 
would flow from having done a cost-benefit analysis of when the 
benefits of restricting the search for authors’ intended meaning 
outweighed the costs. That, as I just said, is what seems to be 
motivating the qualms Goldsworthy is feeling in the legal realm 
about legislators’ subjective intentions. And that is all perfectly 
understandable. Yet, in my view, it remains a mistake to say that 
because of such concerns, and in some ineffable way, the 
“meaning” of the legal text is not what the authors’ intended. I 
think what is a better characterization is to be blunt and just say 
that, for rule of law and other policy reasons in law (and as regards 
legal interpretation), one might choose to lay down a rule (or 
rules) that sometimes restricts the search for evidence of authors’ 
intentions. Alexander himself does not deny that such a step 
might be defensible. Indeed, back in 2004, he and Saikrishna 
Prakash made plain that in their view the only two plausible 
games in town—and I am talking now specifically about legal 
interpretation—are i) interpreters use all the evidence there is of 
authors’ intentions, and ii) we restrict some of the evidence that 
can be sought for various policy-based reasons (of the sort 
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Goldsworthy focuses upon).13 Moreover, you can make that 
choice between i) and ii) without undergoing some partial, limited 
Damascene conversion that shifts your allegiance from SI to OI 
in the legal realm. Rather, you just concede that other things 
matter too, not just a law’s meaning, especially (or perhaps, only) 
where the lawmaker has plenty of scope to try again, and this time 
be clearer. Yes, there will be a cost in terms of authority and why 
people should obey not the law, but instead this cost/benefit rule 
that once in a blue moon gives us something different from the 
intended law. But there will be rule-of-law benefits too. And no 
doubt different people would, and do, strike different bargains 
between i) and ii). At any rate, that is how I would characterize 
what is going on and where the competing trade-offs lie.14 
Returning to Part II of this fine book, the final two 
contributions are by Laurence Claus and Alon Harel. Claus 
focuses on interpretation in federalism disputes, and rightly 
argues that enumeration of Congress’s legislative powers by itself 
would never provide much, or at least enough, certainty. Such 
grants of powers simply do not deliver rule-like determinacy. This 
is a very interesting chapter, and Alexander agrees with Claus. In 
Alexandrian terms, this is because “enumerated powers function 
as standards, not rules. They must be given determinacy by 
further lawmaking [by the court].” (p.426). Meanwhile Harel 
agrees with the Alexander/Schauer line that the basic function of 
 
 13. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 3. 
 14. And in line with that characterization of mine, I argued back in 2000 (in an article 
that seems to have convinced absolutely no one) that there are solid grounds for making 
different cost-benefit analyses as regards statutory interpretation and constitutional 
interpretation. See James Allan, Constitutional Interpretation v. Statutory Interpretation: 
Understanding the Attractions of “Original Intent”, 6 LEGAL THEORY 109 (2000). In other 
words, I would be more open to restrictions vis-à-vis statutory interpretation than 
constitutional interpretation, because the comparative costs of the lawmaker responding 
to the interpreter (of over-riding the authoritative and legitimate source of law based on 
some policy-related search-restricting rule) are so much lower with statutes. Put 
differently, we should be much more open to restrictions as regards statutes, because there 
is much, much more scope for the legislature to respond and say “you got our meaning 
wrong by using these rule-of law enhancing presumptions, so we have passed a new, clearer 
statute.” With constitutional interpretation, by contrast, you basically can never do that; 
we know going in, indeed, the top judges doing the constitutional interpreting know going 
in, that constitutional amendments correcting an erroneous imputed “meaning” that 
results from some policy-related interpretive rule will not happen, or virtually never will 
happen.  Hence the costs of using a “let’s advance rule of law or keep costs contained” rule 
will be considerably higher in constitutional interpretation while biting much less into the 
authority of law as regards statutes, where there is a realistic chance the legislature will and 
can reply.” 
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law is settlement, and indeed with Alexander’s position that the 
Supreme Court has to provide such settlement domestically. (p. 
221). Harel then argues for there being a sort of intrinsic value to 
constitutional settlement. (p. 228). Alexander at that point 
demurs. (p. 426). My disagreement with that sort of 
Kantian/intrinsic line of argument is much more fundamental, as 
I have set out in a recent review of Harel’s book, Why Law 
Matters.15 
That brings me to Part IV of the book, which I can cover 
much more quickly. Mitch Berman attacks Alexander’s claim that 
there are no such things as legal principles. Emily Sherwin, Leo 
Katz, and Alvaro Sandroni all discuss Alexander’s well-known 
elucidation of what he dubs “the gap”—referring to the fact that 
well-meaning and reasonable lawmakers have good grounds to 
lay down general rules that their subjects will at some point have 
good reason not to comply with. In utilitarian terms, so not 
Alexander’s, Rule Utility will give good reasons for there being 
rules that, if always followed by everyone, will deliver more 
utility/welfare/happiness than if people make individual 
calculations on their own on a case-by-case basis, and yet 
situations will arise for all citizens when Act Utility points them 
towards not following the rule, however much they factor in other 
people’s reliance, the fact having the rule rather than not is 
optimal, the criminal penalties for disobedience, everything.  
There will always be this gap. Alexander says this dilemma is 
insoluble. I think he is right.  Meanwhile the whole discussion of 
this problem, by the contributors and with Alexander’s take at the 
end, is fascinating. That leaves the final two chapters in Part III, 
one by Steven Smith and one by William Baude. Smith’s chapter 
is excellent and funny, arguing that, in a way, Alexander is a closet 
anarchist. Or rather, that is where Alexander’s relentlessly 
analytical arguments—not least on the elusiveness of authority—
take him. Smith’s contribution is very sympathetic to Alexander, 
and yet very convincing indeed as regards some of the 
implications of the Alexandrian oeuvre. As for Baude, let me just 
say that it is very seldom indeed that I read someone get the better 
of an argument with Larry Alexander.  In my view Baude does 
just that in his chapter, even after considering Alexander’s reply.  
Both are a treat, but Baude’s claim that Alexander cannot have 
 
 15. James Allan, Why Politics Matters—A Review of Why Law Matters, 9 
JURISPRUDENCE 132 (2018).  
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both the cake of judicial supremacy while also eating the truth of 
originalism, convinced me, and I recommend the exchange to all 
readers. 
Let me conclude in an unusual manner. I have read many, 
many of these sort of “compilation of different contributors’ 
chapters” type books. Not only is this one of the best of the lot; it 
is also without doubt the book that, in my view, has the most 
sympathetic, touching, classy, and just downright beautifully 
articulated introduction I have ever come across. Heidi Hurd is to 
be congratulated, not just on putting together this very fine book, 
but in giving us the new high watermark when it comes to 
introductions. Suffice to say that I would pay big money for her to 
write one for me. 
 
